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Abstract
Existing logical models do not fairly represent epistemic situations with fallible
justifications, e.g., Russell’s Prime Minister example, though such scenarios have
long been at the center of epistemic studies. We introduce justification epistemic
models, JEM, which can handle such scenarios. JEM makes justifications prime
objects and draws a distinction between accepted and knowledge-producing justifi-
cations; belief and knowledge become derived notions. Furthermore, Kripke models
can be viewed as special cases of JEM s with additional assumptions of evidence
insensitivity and common knowledge of the model. We argue that JEM can be
applied to a range of epistemic scenarios in CS, AI, Game Theory, etc.
1 Context and motivations
We make the case that formal epistemology should venture, when needed, beyond modal
logic limits. This includes a formal treatment of justifications, which have been at the
heart of epistemic discussions since Plato.
Proof systems of justification logic and general purpose classes of models for these
systems have been studied in [3, 4, 5, 7, 10, 11, 16, 17, 19] and many other sources.
However, for formalizing epistemic scenarios, one needs specific domain-dependent models,
with additional features that are not necessary for standard soundness and completeness
analysis of proof systems.
We introduce justification epistemic models, JEM, in which justifications are primary
objects and a distinction is made between accepted and knowledge-producing justifica-
tions. In JEM s, belief and knowledge are derived notions which depend on the status
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of supporting justifications. We argue that JEMs can work in situations in which stan-
dard non-hyperintensional tools (Kripke, topological, algebraic) fail to fairly represent the
corresponding epistemic structure.
This paper is self-contained due to streamlining the exposition of justification models,
an essential ingredient of JEM s.
1.1 Comparisons to other semantics of justifications
Justification logics are obtained from the usual propositional logic by adding new atoms
of the sort
t:F
in which t denotes a justification, F a formula, and t:F is read informally as
t is a justification of F.
The first mathematical semantics of justification logic appeared in [2] (cf. also [3])
for the Logic of Proofs LP, namely, a constructive version of the canonical model and
arithmetical semantics in which t:F was interpreted as t is a proof of F.
In [17], the canonical model construction for LP was formulated in a set-theoretic
format, with interpreting proof objects t as sets of formulas t∗ and speaking of “t:F is
true” as F ∈ t∗. This led to generic basic models for justification logics (cf. [5, 16] and
the current paper). In a basic model ∗,
|=∗ t:F iff F ∈ t
∗.
To represent multiple possible worlds, basic models were generalized tomodular models
for justification logic J in [5], and then extended to other justification logics in [16]. A
modular model is a Kripke model (W,R, |=) with a basic model ∗(u) at each world u ∈ W .
Evaluation of justification assertions t:F is defined canonically:
u |= t:F iff F ∈ t∗(u).
Mkrtychev models were also developed in [17] to capture reflexivity in the Logic of
Proofs. In Mkrtychev models, propositional and justification evaluations are similar to
those in basic models (propositions are Boolean, justification terms are sets of formulas),
but the justification assertions t:F are evaluated as “t is a justification for F and F is
true”:
|=∗ t:F iff F ∈ t
∗ and |=∗ F.
Conceptually, Mkrtychev models are close to reflexive basic models: each reflexive basic
model is a Mkrtychev model, each Mkrtychev model contains a reflexive basic model,
However, Mkrtychev models are often easier to work with for justification logics with
reflection.
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Fitting models for LP were introduced and developed in [10] and then extended to
other justification logics. Conceptually, the basic model approach reflects only one reason
for not knowing F : no sufficient justification for F is available. In contrast, Fitting models
take into account two reasons for not knowing F : the Kripkean reason, F fails in some
possible world; and the awareness reason, no justification for F is available. Technically, a
Fitting model is a Kripke model (W,R, |=) with a basic model ∗(u) at each world u ∈ W
(together with appropriate closure conditions). The difference between Fitting models
and modular models lies in the evaluation of justification assertions: for Fitting models,
u |= t:F iff F ∈ t∗(u) and R(u) |= F.
This secures the Justification Yields Belief (JYB) property : t:F yields ‘F is believed’ (i.e.,
F holds at all accessible worlds).
Modular/basic models have clear motivations and provide an answer to the ontological
question What kind of logical object is a justification? However, these models might be
difficult to work with, and more convenient constructions, such as Mkrtychev and Fitting
models, are normally used instead.
Technically, basic models and Mkrtychev models may be regarded as special cases of
Fitting models. On the other hand, Fitting models can be identified as modular models
with JYB, cf. [5]. This provides a natural hierarchy of the aforementioned classes of
models:
basic and Mkrtychev models ⊂ Fitting models ⊂ modular models ⊂ JEM.
Even the smallest class, basic models, is already sufficient for mathematical completeness
of justification logics. So, the main idea of progressing to Fitting models, modular mod-
els, or JEM s is not a pursuit of completeness but rather a desire to offer natural and
manageable models for a variety of epistemic situations involving evidence, belief, and
knowledge.
1.2 Novelties
Several things in this paper might be considered novelties.
1. Separating accepted justifications and knowledge-producing justifications,
and making knowledge and justified belief derived notions. Building an adequate model
for Russell’s Prime Minister example as a showcase.
2. Streamlined exposition of generic semantics for justifications as sets of formulas,
connecting basic justification models with the canonical model of propositional classical
logic.
3. Asserting logic J− instead of J (cf. Section 4.2) as in [4], to be the base system of
justification epistemic logic.
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2 Preliminaries
Standard modal epistemic models have “propositional” precision, i.e., they do not distin-
guish sentences with the same truth values at each possible world. The expressive power
of such models for analysis of justification, belief, and knowledge is rather limited, and so
we have to “go hyperintensional.”1 Specifically, if, at all possible worlds, t is a justification
for F
 t:F,
and G has the same truth value as F
F ↔ G,
we still cannot conclude that t is a justification for G
6 t:G.
A natural example comes from mathematics: both statements 0 = 0 and Fermat’s Last
Theorem, FLT, are true (proven) mathematical facts and hence are true at all possible
worlds. However, we cannot claim that a proof of 0 = 0 is a proof of FLT as well.
A sample justification logic analysis of standard epistemic situations (Gettier exam-
ples, Red Barn example) is presented in [4] using Fitting models [10] though, due to
the relative simplicity of those examples, this analysis could be replicated in a bi-modal
language (cf. [20]).
However, we cannot go much farther without adopting a justification framework: the
situation changes when we have to represent several conflicting pieces of evidence for a
stated fact, cf. the following Russell example of 1912 ([18]):
If a man believes that the late Prime Minister’s last name began with a ‘B,’ he
believes what is true, since the late Prime Minister was Sir Henry Campbell
Bannerman2. But if he believes that Mr. Balfour was the late Prime Minister,
he will still believe that the late Prime Minister’s last name began with a ‘B,’
yet this belief, though true, would not be thought to constitute knowledge.
To keep it simple, we consider proposition B
the late Prime Minister’s last name began with a ‘B,’
with two justifications for B: the right one r and the wrong one w; the agent chooses w
as a reason to believe that B holds.
1From [9]: “Hyperintensional contexts are simply contexts which do not respect logical equivalence.”
2which was true in 1912
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There is a mathematical version of the story with a true proposition and its
two justifications; one is correct, the other is not. Consider the picture3:
16 6
6 64
=
1
4
. (1)
The true proposition is “16/64 = 1/4,” the right justification is dividing both
the numerator and the denominator by 16, and the wrong (but shorter and
easier) justification is simplifying as in (1).
To formalize Russell’s scenario in modal logic (cf. [20]), we introduce two modalities:
K for knowledge and J for justified belief. In the real world,
• B holds;
• JB holds, since the agent has a justification w for B;
• KB does not hold;
thus yielding the set of assumptions
Γ = {B, JB, ¬KB}.
However, Γ doesn’t do justice to Russell’s scenario: the right justification r is not
represented and Γ rather corresponds to the same scenario but lacking r. The intrinsic
epistemic structure of the example is not respected.
Within the JEM framework, introduced in this paper, we provide a model for Russell’s
Prime Minister example which, we wish to think, fairly represents its intrinsic epistemic
structure.
3 Generic logical semantics of justifications
What kinds of logical objects are justifications? When asked in a mathematical context
“what is a predicate?,” we have a ready answer: a subset of a Cartesian product of the
domain set. Within an exact mathematical theory, there should be a similar kind of
answer to the question “what is a justification?”.
We consider this question in its full generality which, surprisingly, yields a clean and
meaningful answer. We assume the language of justification logic consists of two disjoint
sets of syntactic objects:
1. a set of justification terms Tm;
3which the author saw on the door of the Mathematics Support Center at Cornell this February.
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2. a set of formulas Fm, built inductively from propositional atoms using Boolean
connectives and the justification formula formation rule: if F is a formula, F ∈ Fm,
and t a justification term, t ∈ Tm, then t:F is again a formula, t:F ∈ Fm.
The meaning assigned to formulas is a classical truth value, 0 for false and 1 for true,
and we retain classical logic behavior for propositional connectives. The key item is to
give meaning to justification terms, and this will be a set of formulas interpreted as the
set of formulas for which it is a justification. Here is a formal definition.
Definition 1 [Basic Model] A basic model, simply called ∗, consists of an interpretation
of the members of Fm, and an interpretation of the members of Tm.
The interpretation of a formula in a basic model is a truth value. That is,
∗ : Fm 7→ {0, 1}.
We assume (X→ Y )∗ = 1 if and only if X∗ = 0 or Y ∗ = 1, and similarly for the other
Boolean connectives. Let also |=∗ X stand for X
∗ = 1.
We interpret justification terms as sets of formulas. That is,
∗ : Tm 7→ 2Fm.
Our final requirement connects the two mapping roles that ∗ plays in a basic model. For
any X ∈ Fm and any t ∈ Tm,
|=∗ t:X if and only if X ∈ t
∗.
It is easy to check that any mapping ∗ from propositional letters to truth values, and
from justification terms to sets of formulas determines a unique basic model.
So far, a basic model is nothing but a classical propositional model in which justifica-
tion assertions t:F are treated as independent propositional atoms.
Note that while propositions are interpreted semantically, as truth values, justifications
are interpreted syntactically, as sets of formulas. This is a principal hyperintensional
feature: a basic model may treat distinct formulas F and G as equal, i.e. F ∗ = G∗, but
still be able to distinguish justification assertions t:F and t:G, e.g., when F ∈ t∗, but
G 6∈ t∗ yielding |=∗ t:F but 6|=∗ t:G.
Definition 2 Let S ⊆ Fm and X ∈ Fm. We write S ⊢ X if formula X is derivable from
the set S of formulas in classical logic treating justification assertions t:F as propositional
atoms, and with Modus Ponens as the only rule of inference. We say that S is consistent
if S 6⊢ ⊥.
A basic model of S is merely a possible world containing S in the canonical
model, i.e., a maximal consistent set Γ of formulas, with the convenience agreement to
read t:F ∈ Γ as F ∈ {X | t:X ∈ Γ}. In this respect, basic models and the canonical model
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are slightly different but obviously equivalent ways of presenting the same object. When
we move to more sophisticated models (Fitting models, modular models), the advantage
of dealing with sets and operations (e.g. basic models) over logical conditions (e.g. the
canonical model) becomes clear.
Definition 3 For S ⊆ Fm, BM(S) is the class of all basic models of S.
Theorem 1 (Generic Soundness and Completeness) Each set of formulas S is sound
and complete with respect to its class of basic models BM (S). In other words, S ⊢ F if
and only if F is true in each basic model of S.
Proof. This theorem is merely a reformulation of the soundness and completeness of
classical propositional logic with hypotheses. Indeed, if S ⊢ F and |=∗ S, then |=∗ F since
propositional derivations respect validity.
If S 6⊢ F , then there is a Boolean evaluation ∗ which makes all formulas from S true,
S∗ = 1, and F false, F ∗ = 0. In this case there are two types of atomic propositions:
propositional letters P and justification assertions t:X . Define
t∗ = {X | (t:X)∗ = 1}
and note that (t:X)∗ = 1 iff X ∈ t∗. Therefore, ∗ is a propositional evaluation and ∗ is a
basic model yielding the same truth values of atomic formulas P and t:X . Since S∗ = 1
and F ∗ = 0, we have |=∗ S and 6|=∗ F for basic model ∗. ✷
An easy corollary: ⊢ F iff F is a tautology (with t:X ’s as distinct propositional atoms).
Example 1 We work with classical logic over Fm, as in Definition 2, taking S = ∅.
1. For any justification term t,
6⊢ t:F.
Straightforward, since t:F is not a propositional tautology. For a specific counter-
model put t∗ = ∅ for each term t ∈ Tm, which makes 6|=∗ t:F .
2. For any propositional letter P , and term t,
6⊢ t:P→P.
Likewise, this holds because t:P→P is not a propositional tautology. Specifically,
put t∗ = Fm and P ∗ = 0, with other assignments being arbitrary. In this model, all
justification assertions are true, but t:P→P is false.
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3. For any propositional letter P , and term t,
6⊢ P→ t:P.
Again, this holds since P→ t:P is not a propositional tautology. For example, put
t∗ = ∅ and P ∗ = 1. In this model, t is not a justification for P (i.e., 6|=∗ t:P ) and
P→ t:P is false.
4. A somewhat less trivial example illustrating hyperintensionality: for a justification
variable x and formula F
6⊢ x:F→x:(F ∧ F ).
The high-level argument is the same: formulas x:F and x:(F ∧ F ) from Boolean
evaluation point of view can be regarded as distinct propositional variables. Hence
x:F → x:(F ∧ F ) is not a tautology. For a countermodel, take x∗ = {F}. Then
|=∗ x:F , but 6|=∗ x:(F ∧ F ). This demonstrates hyperintensionality of justification
logic base, since F and F ∧ F are provably equivalent, but not x:F and x:(F ∧ F ).
4 Basic Justification Logic J−
Within the Justification Logic framework, there are two sorts of logical objects: justifica-
tion terms Tm and formulas Fm. Let us become more specific about both.
• For Tm, reserve a set of justification constants a, b, c, . . . with indices, and variables
x, y, z, . . . with indices. Justification terms are built from constants and variables
by a binary operation · (application).
• Formulas are built from propositional letters p, q, r, . . . (with indices) and Boolean
constant ⊥ (falsum) by the standard Boolean connectives ∧,∨,→,¬ with a new
formation rule: whenever t is a justification term and F is a formula, t :F is a
formula (with the informal reading “t is a justification for F”).
The logical system J− consists of two groups of postulates.
• Background logic: axioms of classical propositional logic, rule Modus Ponens.
• Application: s:(F→G)→ (t:F→ [s·t]:G).
Basic models corresponding to J− are the ones in which the application axiom holds.
They can be specified by a natural combinatorial condition.
Definition 4 For sets of formulas S and T , we define
S ⊲ T = {F | G→F ∈ S and G ∈ T for some G}.
Informally, S ⊲ T is the result of applying Modus Ponens once to all members of S and of
T (in a given order).
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Theorem 2 BM (J−) is the class of basic models with the following closure condition
s∗ ⊲ t∗ ⊆ (s·t)∗. (2)
Proof. Let us assume the closure condition (2) and check the validity of the application
axiom. Indeed, |=∗ s:(F→G) and |=∗ t:F yield (F→G) ∈ s
∗ and F ∈ t∗. By the closure
condition, G ∈ [s·t]∗, i.e., |=∗ [s·t]:G.
Now assume the application axiom and derive the closure condition (2). Let (F →
G) ∈ s∗ and F ∈ t∗. By definitions, this yields |=∗ s : (F → G) and |=∗ t :F . By the
application axiom, |=∗ [s·t]:G, hence G ∈ [s·t]
∗. ✷
Example 2 None of the formulas from Example 1: t:F , t:P → P , P → t:P , x:F → x:
(F ∧F ) is derivable in J−. Indeed, every specific evaluation from Example 1.1–3 satisfies
the closure condition (2), hence their countermodels are J−-models. Consider the latter
formula (4). Put x∗ = {F} and t∗ = Fm for all other terms t. The closure condition (2)
holds vacuously, hence ∗ is a J−-model. Obviously, |=∗ x:F and 6|=∗ x:(F ∧ F ).
Constants in justification logic are used to denote justifications of assumptions, in
particular, axioms. Indeed, as we have already seen in Example 2, no formula t :F is
derivable in J−. In particular, no logical axiom is assumed justified in J− which is not
realistic.
Definition 5 A set S of formulas is reflexive if for each s:t:F ∈ S, t:F is also in S. By
constant specification CS we understand a reflexive set of formulas of the type
cn:cn−1:cn−2: . . . c1:A
where A is a J−-axiom and ci are justification constants. The major classes of constant
specifications:
• empty,
• total— (each constant is a justification for each axiom),
• axiomatically appropriate (each axiom has a justification at any depth),
• injective (each constant justifies at most one axiom).
Let CS be a constant specification. Then by J−(CS), we understand J− with additional
axioms CS. A CS-model is a model in which all formulas from CS hold.
Corollary 1 Basic models for J−(CS ) are the basic CS-models for J−. J−(CS) is sound
and complete with respect to the class of its basic models.
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4.1 Sharp models
In closure condition (2) from Theorem 2, one cannot, generally speaking, replace the
inclusion “⊆” by the equality “=” without violating completeness Theorem 1.
Indeed, fix a justification constant 0 and consider logic
L = J− + {¬0:F | F ∈ Fm}.
Informally, justification 0 receives empty evaluation in any basic model, 0∗ = ∅. We claim
that formula F = ¬[0·0]:P is not derivable in L, but is true in any basic model of L with
the closure condition s∗ ⊲ t∗ = (s·t)∗. To show that L 6⊢ F , it suffices to find a basic model
for L in which F is false. Consider a basic model ♯ such that 0♯ = ∅ and t♯ = Fm for
any other justification term t. Obviously, the closure condition from Theorem 2, together
with 0♯ = ∅, is met. Therefore, ♯ is a basic model of L. It is immediate that F is false
in ♯, since [0 ·0]♯ = Fm. On the other hand, for any basic model of L with the closure
condition (0·0)∗ = 0∗ ⊲ 0∗, (0·0)∗ = ∅ since 0∗ = ∅ and ∅ ⊲ ∅ = ∅.
Definition 6 Sharp basic models are those in which the application closure condition
has the form
(s·t)∗ = s∗ ⊲ t∗. (3)
One can prove that J− and all its constant specification extensions of J−(CS) are
complete with respect to their sharp basic models. We skip the proof as not essential for
the purposes of this paper.
Note that a sharp model is completely defined by evaluations of atomic propositions
and atomic justifications.
4.2 Other justification logics
There is a whole family of justification logics and they all extend J−; the reader is referred
to [4, 7] for details. Here we list just the main systems of justification logic for a general
orientation.
Logic J is obtained from J− by adding a new operation on justifications ‘+’ and the
Sum principle
s:F ∨ t:F→ [s+ t]:F.
Logics JD, JT, J4, J5, etc., are obtained by adding the corresponding combination of
principles
D = ¬t:⊥,
T = t:F→F,
4 = t:F→ !t:t:F,
5 = ¬t:F→ ?t:¬t:F.
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Historically, the first justification logic was the Logic of Proofs LP [2, 3] which in these
notations can be identified as JT4. By now, the family of justification logics has grown
to be infinite, cf. [12].
5 Justification Epistemic Models
We need more expressive power to capture epistemic differences between justifications
and their use by the knower. Some justifications are knowledge-producing, some are not.
The agent makes choices on which justifications to base an agent’s beliefs/knowledge
and which justifications to ignore in this respect. These actions are present in epistemic
scenarios, out of which we will primarily focus on Russell’s example, which has it all:
• there are justifications w (Balfour was the late prime minister) and r (Bannerman
was the late prime minister) for B;
• r is knowledge-producing whereas w is not;
• the agent opts to base his belief on w and ignores r;
• the resulting belief is evidence-based, but is not knowledge.
Fix J−(CS) for some axiomatically appropriate constant specification CS.
Definition 7 A set X of justification terms is properly closed if X contains all constants
and is closed under applications. If Y is a set of justification terms, then by Y we mean
the proper closure of Y , i.e., the minimal properly closed superset of Y .
Definition 8 A (basic) Justification Epistemic Model (JEM) is
(∗,A, E)
where
• ∗ is a basic J−(CS)-model;
• A ⊆ Tm is a properly closed set A of accepted justifications4;
• E ⊆ Tm is a properly closed sets E of knowledge-producing justifications; all knowledge-
producing justification should be factive, |=∗ t:F→F for each F and each t ∈ E .
Both sets A and E contain all constants. This definition presumes that constants in a
model are knowledge-producing and accepted.
4Consistency |=∗ ¬t:⊥ for any t ∈ A may or may not be required.
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Definition 9 Sentence F is believed if there is t ∈ A such that |=∗ t:F . Sentence F is
known if there is t ∈ A ∩ E such that |=∗ t:F .
By ground term we understand a term containing no (justification) variables. In other
words, a term is ground iff it is built from justification constants only.
Sets of accepted and knowledge-producing justifications overlap on ground terms but
otherwise are in a general position5. There may be accepted but not knowledge-producing
justifications, and vice versa. So, JEM s do not analyze why certain justifications are
knowledge-producing (knowledge-grade) or accepted, but rather provide a formal frame-
work that accommodates these notions.
5.1 Injective justifications
The notions of accepted and knowledge-producing justifications should be utilized with
some caution. Imagine a justification t for F (i.e., t :F holds) and for G (t :G) such
that, intuitively, t is a knowledge-producing justification for F but not for G. Is such a
t knowledge-producing, trustworthy, acceptable for a reasonable agent? The answers to
these questions seem to depend on F and G, and if we prefer to handle justifications as
objects rather than as justification assertions, it is technically convenient to assume that
justifications are injective, or statement-specific:
there is at most one formula F such that t:F holds.
Conceptually, by going injective with justifications, one does not lose generality: if p is
a proof of F and of something else, then the same p with a designated statement F ,
symbolically, a pair (p, F ), can be regarded as an injective/single conclusion proof of F .
So, with injective justifications without losing generality we gain the ability to go back
and forth between justifications and statements.
In model R for the Russell Example, Section 6, all justifications are injective.
Note that J− is not complete with respect to the class of basic models which are both
sharp and injective (as model R for the Russell Example). Indeed, consider formula F ,
F = ¬(x:(P→Q) ∧ y:P ∧ [x·y]:R)
where P,Q,R are distinct propositional letters and x, y justification variables. Obviously,
F holds in any basic model ∗ which is sharp and injective. Imagine a sharp injective ∗
in which x:(P→Q) and y:P hold. In such ∗, [x·y]∗ = {Q}, hence both ¬[x·y]:R, and F
hold. On the other hand, F is not derivable in J−, e.g., F fails in the basic model ∗ with
x∗ = {P →Q}, y∗ = {P}, and t∗ = Fm for any other t (check closure condition (2)!).
5In principle, one could consider smaller sets A, which would correspond to the high level of skepticism
of an agent who does not necessarily accept logical truths (axioms) as justified. We leave this possibility
for further studies.
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So, “sharp and injective” justification tautologies constitute a proper extension of J−. It
would be interesting to find its complete axiomatization. It would seem that functionality
axioms from [8, 14, 15] might be relevant here.
6 Russell scenario as a JEM
Consider the version of J− in language with two justification variables w and r, one
propositional letter B, and injective constant specification CS :
cn:A ∈ CS iff A is an axiom and n is the Go¨del number of A.
Define a model ∗ such that
• B∗ = 1, i.e., |=∗ B;
• c∗n = {A} if A is an axiom and n is the Go¨del number |A| of A, and c
∗
n = ∅ otherwise;
• w∗ = r∗ = {B}, e.g., |=∗ r:B and 6|=∗ r:F for any F other than B (the same for w);
• Application is sharp: (s·t)∗ = s∗ ⊲ t∗.
A JEM R (for Russell’s scenario) is (∗,A, E) with
• A = {w}, i.e., the set of accepted justifications is {w}, properly closed;
• E = {r}, i.e., the set of knowledge-producing justifications is {r}, properly closed.
Though the idea behind R is quite intuitive, we need to fill in some technical details:
extending truth evaluations to all terms and formulas and checking closure conditions.
6.1 Technicalities of the model
Put c∗|A| = {A} for each axiom A of J
−(CS). Technically, this is an inductive definition.
Base: c∗0 = ∅, given 0 is not a Go¨del number of any formula. Inductive step: suppose n
is the Go¨del number |F | of some formula F . If F is an axiom of J−, put c∗n = {F}. If
F = ck:G for some ck and G, then, by monotonicity of Go¨del numbering, k < n, hence c
∗
k
is defined. If c∗k = {G}, then ck:G is an axiom of J
−(CS) and we can put c∗n = {F}. In
all other cases, c∗n = ∅.
Since application is sharp, the evaluation of each term is, at most, a singleton. To-
gether with Boolean truth tables, this determines the truth value of any formula.
Lemma 1 Each t ∈ Tm is factive, |=∗ t:F→F .
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Proof. Induction on t. Assume |=∗ t:F ; that means t
∗ = {F}. If t is w or r, then F is
B, which is true in the model ∗. If t is a constant, then F is an axiom and hence true in
∗. The induction step corresponds to application, which preserves the truth of justified
formulas. ✷
From Lemma 1 it follows that all accepted justifications are consistent and all knowledge-
producing justifications are factive. Therefore, R = (∗,A, E) is indeed a JEM.
6.2 Main result
Theorem 3 In model R, sentence B is true, justified and believed, but not known.
Proof. In model R, sentence B is
• true, since |=∗ B;
• justified, since |=∗ w:B;
• believed, since w ∈ A.
We have to show that for any justification g ∈ A ∩ E , 6|=∗ g:B.
Consider an auxiliary basic model • which is the same as ∗ but with B• = 0, i.e., the
truth value of B is flipped from ‘true’ to ‘false.’ In particular, application in • is sharp.
Lemma 2 For each justification term t,
t∗ = t•.
Proof. The inductive process (based on sharp application) of evaluating all justifications
given evaluations of atomic justifications operates only with formulas of type t :F and
starts with the same initial set of such formulas in ∗ and •. Hence the results of these
processes in ∗ and • coincide.
✷
In particular, for all g ∈ A ∩ E , g∗ = g•, and if |=∗ g:B, then |=• g:B as well.
Lemma 3 Each g ∈ A ∩ E is factive in •, i.e., |=• g:F→F .
Proof. All g ∈ A ∩ E are obtained from constants by application. By construction, if
|=• c:X , then X ∈ c
∗ and X is an axiom, hence true. Application obviously preserves
factivity.
✷
To complete the proof of Theorem 3, suppose R |= g:B, i.e., |=∗ g:B, for some g ∈ A∩ E .
By Lemma 2, |=• g:B, and, by Lemma 1, |=• B, which is not the case.
✷
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6.3 Can Russell’s scenario be made modal?
One could try to express Russell’s scenario in a modal language by introducing the justified
belief modality
JF ⇔ there is t ∈ A such that |= t:F ,
and the knowledge-producing modality
EF ⇔ there is t ∈ E such that |= t:F ,
and by stipulating that F is known iff F is both accepted and supported by a knowledge-
producing justification:
KF ⇔ JF ∧ EF.
This, however, fails, since both JB and EB hold inR, butKB does not. We are facing
a Gettier-style phenomenon, when a proposition is supported by a knowledge-producing
justification (hence true), and believed, but not known (since knowledge-producing and
accepted justifications for B are different). This once again illustrates the limitations of
modal language in tracking and sorting justifications.
7 Multi-world JEMs and epistemic Kripke models
A multi-world version of JEM is
M = (W, ∗,A, E)
such that W is a nonempty set of states (possible worlds) and for each u ∈ W , the
corresponding (∗,A, E) is a single-state JEM.
Let us outline what simplifying assumptions would make a JEM M = (∗,A, E) a
Kripke model for modal logic.
First, we have to convert justification assertions t:F into modal epistemic assertions
✷F . A natural way of accomplishing this would be postulating a justification indifference
property:
t:F ↔ s:F
holds at each world.
Second, we have to adopt an additional fully explanatory property of the model. We
define the accessibility relation R on W as
uRv iff for all t and F , u |= t:F ⇒ v |= F.
This standard definition secures that
u |= t:F ⇒ R(u) |= F,
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but not “⇔,” which is a hidden assumption in Kripke models, cf. [6]. We have to make
this assumption explicit. A model M is fully explanatory, if
R(u) |= F ⇒ for some t, u |= t:F,
cf. [10] in which this property was introduced and studied. The fully explanatory property
can be viewed as a propositional form of knowledge of the model, cf. [6].
It is now straightforward that modal logic T corresponds to JEMs with justification
indifference and the fully explanatory property (a narrow special case of JEMs). To
obtain more conventional S5-models, we have to adopt yet another additional assumption
of decidability of justifications, but leave this to further studies.
8 Discussion
Model R fairly represents a situation with two justifications, right and wrong, for a given
proposition and, in this respect, serves as a showcase for modeling epistemic situations
with fallible justifications.
There are many natural open questions that indicate possible research directions:
• Are justification assertions checkable, decidable for an agent?
• Is the property of a justification to be knowledge-producing checkable by the agent?
• In multi-agent cases, how much do agents know about each other and about the
model?
• Do agents know each other’s accepted and knowledge-producing justifications?
• What is a complete axiomatization of sharp and injective models over J−?
• What is the complexity of these new justification logics and what are their feasible
fragments which make sense for epistemic modeling?
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